Inequality: What’s in a word? by Lannen, Anu et al.
The research featured here is 
focused globally.
Trendy ‘development speak’?
Each year, Oxfam tells us how a 
dwindling number of rich men 
own most of the world’s wealth.1 
Books and articles on inequality 
abound.2 The stated aim of Sus-
tainable Development Goal 10 is 
to “Reduce inequality within and 
among countries”.3 Cynics might 
see it is as a simple rebranding 
exercise by the development com-
munity and researchers, merely 
swapping a nominal focus on 
poverty for one on inequality. 
What does it really add? As it 
turns out, a lot.
Wrinkles in Kuznets’ curve
First of all, the growing inequality 
we have woken up to in the glob-
al North shows the failure of an 
economic (policy) idea that ruled 
for decades: Namely, that mar-
ket-led economic growth, meas-
ured in GDP, would inevitably 
improve the lives of all, especially 
at more advanced stages. We 
now know that Kuznets’ optimis-
tic mid-century theory is deeply 
flawed.4 Economic inequality is 
not simply a necessary step in de-
velopment that automatically de-
clines after countries industrialize 
Ten years have passed since the global financial crisis first struck. But its 
shockwaves remain with us, from depressed wages and persistent debt 
burdens to charged protest movements, divisive politics, and renewed 
nationalisms – especially, but not only, in the rich global North. Moreover, 
the broader economic discourse has radically changed, with worldwide 
implications. Researchers and the (sustainable) development community, 
in particular, both echo and shape this changing global discourse. Today, 
inequality is on everyone’s lips. This policy brief examines inequality, and 
how its perspective on poverty and wealth can enhance research and policy. 
Above all, use of an inequality lens fosters vital systems thinking about how 
wealth is created, who captures it, who loses it – or bears the ecological 
costs – and how to achieve fairer outcomes.
Inequality: What’s in a word?
KEY MESSAGES
•  Focusing on inequality fosters ur-
gently needed systems thinking 
about how economic value is pro-
duced, accumulates among some 
groups, and is lost by others. It 
also highlights related ecological 
harms, and how these are distrib-
uted. In short, it helps show how 
concentrated wealth and poverty 
are made and might be unmade 
for more sustainable, egalitarian 
outcomes.
•  This view also identifies key 
 actors who have benefitted or 
suffered from recent economic 
trends. Beneficiaries include 
transnational firms, the financial 
sector, executives, major share-
holders, and the already wealthy. 
Sufferers include democratic 
states, workers in the global 
North, and many groups in the 
global South – the latter especial-
ly in terms of ecological burdens.
•  Examining the links between 
these actors reveals key dynamics 
that may drive inequality. They 
include financialization, debt, 
consolidation of global markets in 
a few hands, and workers’ loss of 
bargaining power. Policymakers, 
researchers, and civil society must 
urgently join forces to design and 
implement redistributive and 
pre-distributive solutions.
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and market forces take hold. Forty-year 
trends in countries like the US5 and UK6, 
which inspired this hypothesis, now show 
the opposite,7,8 as do trends in some de-
veloping countries.9 And according to the 
World Bank (2016), the United Nations’ 
goal of ending global poverty by 2030 
cannot be achieved by relying on current 
patterns of growth.10
A systemic view
Of central importance for researchers 
and policymakers, focusing on inequality 
fosters a much-needed systemic view of 
poverty. This emerges from its relational, 
comparative perspective. Instead of look-
ing narrowly at the plight of low-income 
workers or landless populations, for ex-
ample, the inequality lens demands we 
zoom out and consider their conditions 
vis-à-vis wealthier groups, locally or glob-
ally. This raises fundamental, systems-level 
questions: How has the wealth at the top 
been created? How does capital circulate 
and accumulate among certain groups? 
Elephant vs. hockey stick?
The potential of this systemic perspective 
is highlighted by the now-famous “ele-
phant curve” chart.11 It visualized rela-
tive rates of income growth worldwide, 
among different income percentiles, from 
1988 to 2008 (see Figure 1, black line). It 
quickly became something of an ideolog-
ical Rorschach test among experts, with 
some celebrating the apparent high rates 
of income growth among the world’s 
poorer half (the elephant’s back, head, 
etc.) and others stressing the stagnation 
visible around the 80th income percentile 
(the sag in the trunk). Worryingly, an up-
dated chart (dubbed “Loch Ness”, not 
pictured) using more data from a longer 
period (1980 to 2016) points to smaller 
income growth rates in the poorer half 
and wider stagnation in the upper third.12 
Finally, charts that plot income gains in 
absolute terms paint a bleak picture: One 
“hockey stick”-looking chart suggests 
that, at current growth rates, it would 
take over 250 years for the world’s poor-
est 10% to reach the average global in-
come level of USD 11 per day (Figure 1, 
red line).13 
Inequality beneficiaries
Notably, despite variations, the different 
charts agree on one particular trend: that 
of a small sliver of the world’s popula-
tion – the top 1% and 0.1% especially 
– vastly increasing its income and wealth 
in recent decades. But whose experience 
do these and other income percentile 
data reflect? To understand inequality, we 
must identify who is benefitting or suffer-
ing from current trends. 
Transnational firms, CEOs, major 
shareholders, and the already rich 
have benefitted greatly from long-term 
shifts in wealth and ownership from the 
public to the private sector14 and from 
bottom to top. According to one re-
cent estimate, 69 of the top 100 econo-
mies (by revenue) are corporations, not 
states.15 Importantly, a growing share 
of this increasing corporate wealth has 
gone to executives and shareholders, not 
to average workers. For example, the 
CEO-to-average-worker pay ratio in the 
US was 30-to-1 in 1978. Today, it is over 
250-to-1.16 Other countries with highly 
unequal ratios are India, the UK, South 
Africa, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 
(over 150-to-1).17 Notably, due to gen-
erous stock options for senior company 
staff, high CEO pay is also a function of 
the now-dominant goal of “maximizing 
shareholder value”.18 This fuels inequality 
because a minority of people and legal 
entities owns most of the world’s stock 
value.19,20
The financial sector has also profited 
immensely. Some economists suggest its 
role deserves extra scrutiny because it 
may steer the questionable actions (e.g. 
corporate mergers, stock buybacks) of 
other powerful actors.21 Further, the prof-
its of financial actors – like private invest-
ment banks and pension funds – may be 
extractive, not productive.22 One example 
is banks’ emphasis on making loans to 
buy existing assets – like homes or land – 
instead of investing in new construction 
or businesses.23 This bids up asset prices, 
fuelling bubbles and speculative gains 
for owners, detached from market fun-
damentals (e.g. labour or material costs). 
Another example is financial firms’ reve-
nues from interest rates, hidden fees, or 
penalties levied on indebted households. 
In such cases, financial actors make prof-
its (adding to GDP), yet nothing of value 
is created.24 Last but not least, financial 
actors are key enablers and beneficiaries 
of global tax avoidance and illicit financial 
flows (www.curbing-iffs.org).
Inequality sufferers
On the flipside are the many actors  
who have arguably lost out as inequality 
grows. 
Democratic states and providers of 
‘public goods’ are especially concerning 
victims of inequality trends. Elites in vari-
ous relatively rich democracies (e.g. Brazil, 
Chile, India, Mexico, South Africa, UK, 
US) have used their wealth to steer state 
policies to serve their interests, at the ex-
pense of lower strata.25 Examples include 
“neoliberal reforms” that cut taxes on 
top incomes and inherited wealth; privat-
ize natural monopolies like railways or 
water utilities; and defund public educa-
tion and social safety-net programmes.26 
Notably, elite capture of the media often 
aids the process.27 The resulting dysfunc-
tion of governments and underfunded 
public institutions (e.g. schools) can cause 
citizens to doubt democratic participation 
and public services altogether, producing 
harmful, inegalitarian cycles. 
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Figure 1: This chart offers a systemic perspective on income growth worldwide in US dollars (1988–2008), in 
which both absolute income growth (“hockey stick”, red line) and relative income growth, i.e. percentage 
change in income (“elephant”, black line), are displayed based on the same data source. (Data: Lackner &  
Milanovic 2013, 2016; Graph: C. Bader 2019)
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The ‘squeezed’ middle and working 
classes of the global North are the 
most publicized sufferers of recent ine-
quality dynamics.28 In Europe, the US, and 
elsewhere, their struggle has been char-
acterized by loss of manufacturing jobs, 
unions, and secure pensions; stagnating 
incomes (despite rising productivity); more 
insecure short-term/part-time employment 
contracts (often in the service sector); and 
rising costs for education, healthcare, and 
housing. Their wealth, if they have any, 
has often taken the form of home owner-
ship (or equity), such that the burst hous-
ing bubble in 2008 erased many people’s 
savings. Particularly in the US, people of 
colour, women, and other marginalized 
subgroups (see intersectionality) have 
been hit hardest.29 Ongoing home evic-
tions and growing levels of personal debt 
show their plight is far from over.30
Undecided?
Finally, there are the countless population 
groups and individual actors – especially 
in middle- and low-income countries in 
Latin America, Africa, Asia, etc. – whose 
experiences “coping with globalization” 
defy easy summary.31 Here, monetary 
measures of wealth and income – includ-
ing the much-debated extreme poverty 
line of USD 1.90 per day – often fail to 
capture people’s well-being. Continued 
research and more specific multidimen-
sional measures of human welfare (e.g. 
nutrition, electricity access, sanitation, 
air quality) are needed to tease out ine-
quality trends among actors in these re-
gions (Bader, Bieri, Wiesmann, Heinimann 
2017). 
The new middle or upper classes in 
China, India, and other Asian countries in 
their orbit (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia) have 
emerged as potent symbols of successful 
export-led development. Economic and 
material gains here have been spectacular, 
marked by breakneck urbanization and 
new high-consuming lifestyles for some 
people. However, the local environmental 
costs of dirty industrialization and produc-
tion – like major air pollution – are serious 
cause for concern, including close to a 
million pollution-related deaths linked to 
export goods in a single year.32 This high-
lights issues of environmental inequality or 
justice – even or especially where economic 
growth rates are highest.33 
Peasants, indigenous people, and the 
poor across the global South are the 
biggest question mark in the inequality 
debate. Their lives remain the site of “de-
velopment” as popularly imagined. CDE 
research in many developing countries 
shows a mixed picture. Whether small 
farmers in South America, plantation 
labourers in Southeast Asia, or green-
house workers in East Africa, much 
depends on the terms (e.g. labour pro-
tections, profit-sharing) and extent (e.g. 
level of wage dependency) of people’s in-
tegration into global value chains (www.
fate.unibe.ch). Land access or ownership 
remains central to many people’s well-be-
ing. Those who lose land often give up 
a life of vulnerability (e.g. subsistence 
farming), at the mercy of nature, for a 
life of precarity (e.g. wage labour), at the 
mercy of fickle markets.34 Stitching to-
gether a livelihood from a mix of activities 
is common. Some groups, like pastoral-
ists in Africa, have been marginalized by 
development efforts. Other pockets of 
poor have simply been bypassed. Pressing 
livelihood threats across the global South 
include climate change, land grabs (www.
landmatrix.org), biodiversity loss, and eco-
logical harm from crop monocultures, ex-
tractive industries, etc. – much of it due 
to the demands of faraway consumers 
and investors (www.telecoupling.unibe.
ch). 
Uncovering key dynamics
With these actors in mind, we can begin 
to identify other systems-level dynamics 
that may characterize their actions, drive 
gains or losses, and link the global North 
and South. 
Rent-seeking arguably unites many of 
today’s private “winners” of inequality 
trends.35 Economic rent – or “unearned 
income” – may be seen as an unjusti-
fied profit margin (above cost) captured 
by powerful players like monopolists or 
patentholders.36 Notably, classical econo-
mists such as Adam Smith originally de-
fined “free markets” as those free from 
such rents. Today, ongoing company 
mergers point to mounting dangers of 
market consolidation and quasi monop-
oly power in vital sectors like energy and 
food. Transnational agribusinesses, for ex-
ample, increasingly control regional input 
markets for farmers (e.g. in South Amer-
ica) and grocery offerings to consumers 
(e.g. in Europe).37 Vertically integrated 
global commodity firms involved in both 
resource (e.g. oil) extraction and trading 
effectively sell goods to themselves, creat-
ing risks of mispricing.38 Drug companies 
exploit patent rules to sell vital medicines 
for much more than they cost to make.39 
Tech firms sell personal data that millions 
of users give them for free.40 And private 
banks enjoy privileges to create (credit) 
money by making interest-bearing loans, 
with many still backed by states if things 
go wrong.41 These dynamics defeat the 
very purpose of markets, squeezing the 
citizens of rich and poor countries alike.
Debt that is treated as non-negotiable 
is a burden shared by many inequality 
“losers”, whether heavily indebted work-
ers (e.g. mortgage, credit card) in the 
global North or whole states (e.g. Mo-
zambique, Jamaica) in the global South.42 
It is arguably impossible to grasp global 
poverty or economic crises without refer-
ence to debt.43 The few economists who 
foresaw the 2008 financial crash were 
keen debt analysts.44 Even the oft-cited 
“resource curse” may actually be tied 
to debt overhang among poor countries 
that borrowed in foreign currencies and 
used their natural resources as collateral.45 
More broadly, interest-bearing debts are 
fundamentally at odds with sustainability: 
“Servicing” them demands ever-increas-
ing economic activity and environmental 
exploitation. The growth of such debt 
obeys mathematical laws, not ecological 
or social limits.46
Financialization in rich areas vs. re-
source exploitation in poor areas is 
another apparent dynamic of inequali-
ty, characterized by a geographic split 
between the global North and South or 
between rich (often urban) centres and 
poor (often rural) peripheries. On the one 
hand, wealthy states or cities cut taxes 
and other regulations as they compete 
to host the headquarters and financial 
flows of “super firms” (one feature of a 
recently posited “finance curse”).47 On 
the other, poorer states or districts cut 
environmental and labour protections 
and slash wages as they compete to host 
extractive industries, manufacturing, or 
production of commodities. People on ei-
ther side of the world may be harmed by 
the same firms, such as when a fee-heavy 
pension fund48 in the global North invests 
in, or “grabs”, land in the global South49; 
or when a firm uses a secretive tax haven 
to avoid tax and environmental responsi-
bilities in multiple countries.50
These are just some of the actors and 
dynamics revealed by shifting the focus 
from poverty to inequality. All in all, it 
helps to identify some of the root causes 
and systems behind poverty and ecolog-
ical harm, and suggests ways of trans-
forming them. 
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Research and policy implications
Adopt an inequality lens for a systemic view of poverty and sustainability
Use of an inequality lens sharpens our focus on key actors and dynamics fuelling poverty 
and unsustainability worldwide. It highlights the increasing wealth and power of a small 
group of people and legal entities that hold most of the world’s value in stocks, bonds, 
real estate, and other forms of savings. It suggests their actions (e.g. rent-seeking), lack 
of proper state/global rules or enforcement (e.g. antitrust), and core systemic flaws (e.g. 
interest on debts) may siphon wealth away from lower social strata and drive ecological 
harms. These dynamics are often masked by “growth for all” rhetoric.
Recognize that wealth is collectively generated, and its distribution depends 
on our beliefs
Inequality reminds us that deficits in one place are often directly linked to surpluses in 
another, with collectively generated value captured by a few. It suggests there is ample 
wealth in circulation to tackle poverty, and doing so is largely a matter of political choice, 
power dynamics, and societal beliefs. It prompts us to ask what we consider desirable, 
and how research and policy can enable more sustainable, egalitarian outcomes.
Restore, reinforce, and replicate proven policies that support shared well-being
Prior generations who faced similar challenges responded with major new policies like 
social security, socialized medicine, and tight control of capital mobility. Today, we can 
expand these and other proven policies, like progressive taxation, union organizing, 
and mission-focused public spending51 – possibly bolstered by renewed “class” aware-
ness and international solidarity among lower social strata. 
Design, implement, and study new policies, including pre-distributive approaches
However, the time is also ripe for new approaches. Policymakers and researchers from 
diverse disciplines should collaborate closely on the design, testing, and study of 
holistic responses.52 Efforts to measure progress should be agnostic about GDP 
growth, focus on multidimensional indicators of human well-being, and rigorously 
scrutinize the distribution of existing wealth and future gains. Promising policy ap-
proaches include pre-distributive measures like limits on top pay (e.g. relative to 
median), guaranteed jobs and living wages for lower social strata, or even universal 
basic assets.53 Other innovative policy ideas include targeted debt jubilees, fairly 
distributed unitary taxation of multinationals, revision of corporate charters (e.g. to 
reflect environmental justice), and reform of finance and credit creation to serve the 
public good.54 
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